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Abstract
Optimal population policy is examined in the following setup. Families invest in 
capital, spend on health care and determine their number of children. Firms produce 
output from labor, capital and pollutants. Pollution increases, but private and pub-
lic health care decrease mortality dynamically, with lags. Our main findings are the 
following. A marginal increase in public health care improves welfare as long as it 
diminishes the mortality rate more than that in private health care. The government 
can decentralize the social optimum by a parental tax on newborns and a Pigouvian 
tax on pollutants. Private health care should not be taxed.
Keywords Optimal taxation · Health care · Lethal pollution · Endogenous fertility 
and mortality
JEL J13 · O44 · Q53 · Q56 · Q58
1 Introduction
Although there is a lot of empirical evidence on the fact that pollution and health 
expenditures influence mortality,1 the studies on evironmental policy examine exter-
nalities related to fertility2, mortality3 or private health expenditures4 separately. 
 * Tapio Palokangas 
 tapio.palokangas@helsinki.fi
 Ulla Lehmijoki 
 ulla.lehmijoki@helsinki.fi
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1 Cf., Samet et al. (2000), Brunekreef and Holgate (2002), Pope et al. (2002), and Lehmijoki and Rovenskaya 
(2010).
2 Cf., Harford (1997, 1998), Jöst and Quaas (2010), Baudin (2011) and De la Croix and Gosseries 
(2012).
3 Cf., Grossman (1972), Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Dalgaard and Strulik (2014).
4 Cf., Gomez (2001) and Baudin (2011).
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The purpose of this document is to consider all those externalities in the same setup 
together with public health care. To do so, we apply optimal tax theory to a dynamic 
fertility  choice model where production-related pollution is lethal, but where the 
families and the government can decrease mortality by spending on health care.
Harford (1997, 1998) examines optimal taxation in a model where altruistic par-
ents determine the number of their children and population growth deteriorates the 
environment, decreasing an individual’s welfare. He shows that to decentralize the 
social optimum, the Pigouvian tax on pollutants must be supported by a parental 
tax on the number of children. Jöst and Quaas (2010) examine optimal taxation in 
a fertility choice model where emissions generate welfare-harming pollution. They 
prove that the externalities must be corrected by two Pigouvian taxes: one on emis-
sions and the other on the number of children or the size of the family. Harford 
(1997, 1998), assume a constant lifetime for an individual, while Jöst and Quaas 
(2010) assume a constant mortality rate (and consequently, a constant expected 
lifetime) for the whole population. In this document, the mortality rate is consid-
ered as an endogenous variable that depends on pollution along with private and 
public health care.
Jöst and Quaas (2010) assume furthermore that emissions are directly used as 
an input in production without costs. Consequently, there is no price for that input 
and no laissez-faire equilibrium in the economy without a tax on emissions. In this 
document, that problem is solved by considering emissions as a by-product of pro-
ductive inputs that are extracted from the nature at a real cost.
Gomez (2001) and Baudin (2011) examine taxation in a fertility choice model 
where the families can reduce mortality by health expenditures. Both of them show 
that if private health expenditures generate positive externality, then it can be opti-
mal to tax them.5 Because the public sector plays a major role in health care in most 
advanced countries, in this document, public services are considered as an alterna-
tive way of controlling that externality: private health care is a mortality-decreasing 
private good with no externality; but public health care can be either a public good 
whose average supply per individual decreases the mortality rate of the whole popu-
lation, or a publicly-provided private good. This changes the whole setup: the prob-
lem is to discover the optimal supply of public health care and the supporting set of 
tax instruments by which the social optimum can be decentralized.
The evolution of the mortality rate is considered in many documents, but through 
the dynamics of some other state variable. Grossman (1972), and Erlich and Chuma 
(1990) introduce health as a mortality-decreasing state variable. Chakraborty 
(2004) assumes that the probability of an individual’s survival depends on health 
capital that is augmented by public investment. Dalgaard and Strulik (2014) con-
sider human aging as a process where the deficits of health are a state variable that 
increases the probability of death. In this document, pollution and health care are 
assumed to influence the mortality rate directly, through a dynamic process.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section  2 presents the 
structure of the economy, including the behavior of the firms. Sections 3 derives 
5 Gomez present this result in the form that a subsidy to fertility decreases welfare.
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the social optimum by a model of the social planner (called the government), 
while Section 4 considers the optimal behavior of the representative family that 
determines its saving, fertility and private health care, taking the taxes, public 
health care and the stock of pollution as given. The comparison of the equilibria 
of the government and the family yields optimal policy rules for a market econ-
omy. Section 5 summarizes the results.
2  The economy as a whole
2.1  The goods market
In the model, time t is continuous and T is the initial time. There is one tradable 
good that is chosen as the numeraire in the model. It is assumed that pollutants 
B – which are called carbon energy in this study, for convenience – are extracted 
from the nature at a constant marginal cost q in terms of the numeraire good. 
Then, the market price for carbon energy is equal to q.
The output Y of the good is used in consumption C, private health care H, pub-
lic health care G, the extraction costs of carbon energy, qB, the depreciation of 
capital K at the constant rate  ∈ (0, 1) , and investment in new capital, dK
dt
:
where KT is capital K at initial time T.
It is convenient to define the macroeconomic variables and the labor input in 
production, L, in proportion to population N as follows:
Output Y is produced from capital K, labor L and carbon energy B according to neo-
classical technology with constant returns to scale. Then, by (2), the per individual 
output y can be defined as a concave and linearly homogeneous function of per indi-
vidual inputs ( k,, b):
2.2  The government’s budget
Let f be the fertility rate, i.e., the number of newborns relative to population N. 
The government controls the economy by public health care G and the taxes f  
(1)Y = C + H + G + qB + K +
dK
dt
, K(T) = KT ,
(2)c ≐ C
N
, h ≐ H
N
, k ≐ K
N
, g ≐ G
N
, y ≐ Y
N





(3)y(k,, b), yk ≐ 𝜕y𝜕k > 0, y ≐
𝜕y
𝜕
> 0, yb ≐ 𝜕y𝜕b > 0.
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and b on fertility fN and carbon energy B, and balances its budget by the poll tax 
n on population N. This defines the budget constraint nN + f fN + bqB = G.
2.3  Firms
The representative firm maximizes its profit Π by its inputs of capital K, labor L and 
carbon energy B subject to technology (3), given population N, the wage w, the interest 
rate r, and the price q and the tax b on carbon energy B [cf., (2) and (3)]:
Because the per individual production function (3) yields constant returns to scale, 
then, in equilibrium, the profit Π is zero and the marginal products of capital, labor 
and carbon energy, yk , y and yb , are equal to the interest rate r, the wage w and the 
producer’s unit cost of carbon energy, q + b , respectively:
2.4  Pollution and population growth
The extraction and use of carbon energy B generates emissions in one-to-one pro-
portion. Emissions B in turn accumulate the stock of pollution P as follows [cf., 
(2)]:
where the constant ξ is the natural absorbtion rate of pollution P.
At every moment of time t, each individual has a given stock of resources that 
can be allocated between labor  and child rearing. Consequently, there is a trans-
formation curve so that the individual has to sacrifice more and more labor  to 
have one more child. Because pollution-induced illnesses decrease the individual’s 
resources, pollution P shifts that transformation curve downwards. Thus, the fertil-
ity rate f is a decreasing function of both labor input  and pollution P. The growth 
rate of population N is then equal to the fertility rate f minus the mortality rate m as 
follows:
By (2) and (7), the change of capital per individual, s ≐ dk
dt










y(k,, b) − w − rk − (q + b)b
]
.





































− (f − m)k, k(T) = kT .
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2.5  Mortality
Pollution P is a negative public good that increases mortality for all individuals 
simultaneously.6 Private health care H is a private good: its input to a single indi-
vidual, h, decreases only that individual’s mortality rate m. Public health care G can 
be a public good as well, but then it is assumed to be proportional to population to 
maintain its efficiency. Hence, public health care per individual, g, decreases every 
individual’s mortality rate m simultaneously. Alternatively, public health care per 
individual, g, can be defined as a publicly-provided private good. Because the vari-
ables (P, g, h) affect mortality over time with lags, the determination of the mortal-
ity rate m can be specified as the following error-correcting process [cf., (2)]:
where M is the long-run mortality rate and  a constant adjustment parameter.7
2.6  Utility
If an individual’s probability of death depended explicitly on the individual’s age, 
then the economy would become a non-autonomous system that depends explicitly 
on time. Because such a system does not have a steady state, it can be solved only 
numerically, but not symbolically by the standard methods of optimal control theory. 
To avoid this problem, we use the classical fertility choice model:8 the basic unit is 
not an individual, but a dynastic family – i.e., a sample of the whole population – that 
is able to keep its mortality and fertility rates stable over time.
In line with Razin and Ben-Zion (1975), Becker (1981), Galor and Weil (1996) 
and Stelter (2016), endogenous fertility is based on the following three assumptions. 
First, the parents are selfish.9 Second, children are a kind of consumption good in 
their parents’ preferences. Finally, every individual’s time horizon is limited by 




= 𝛾[M(P, g, h) − m], 𝛾 ∈ (0, 1), m(T) = mT , MP ≐ 𝜕M𝜕P > 0,
Mh ≐ 𝜕M𝜕h < 0, Mg ≐
𝜕M
𝜕g
< 0, M strictly convex in (g, h),
6 According to many epidemiological studies (cf., Samet et al. 2000, Brunekreef and Holgate 2002, Pope 
et al. 2002, and Lehmijoki and Rovenskaya 2010), this holds true.
7 In the extreme special case with lim→1 , the current mortality rate m(t) would be a function of current 
pollution P(t) and current health care (h(t), g(t)). Because the use of dynamic programming approximates 
the policy rules in the vicinity of the steady state, the results are the same also in that special case. The 
strict convexity of the long-term mortality rate M in private and public health care per individual, (h, g), 
ensures a unique equilibrium. It characterizes decreasing returns in controlling environmental damages.
8 Cf., Becker (1981), Gomez (2001) and Jöst and Quaas (2010).
9 Because in the model capital per individual, k = K∕N , is the only asset that a parent can leave to its 
offspring at the moment of his/her death, it is possible to introduce altruism into the model by plac-
ing k as an argument into the utility function (10). This would slightly complicate the calculations, but, 
because the utility function U would nevertheless be the same for both the government and the repre-
sentative family, altruism brings no externality into the model and consequently, the results would be the 
same.
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her expected utility over time. In Appendix 1, it is shown that these three assump-
tions lead to the following utility function for the representative family in the 
economy:10
where c is consumption per individual, f the fertility rate [cf., (7)], 𝜌 > 0 the constant 
rate of time preference for an individual who could live forever and  + m is the 
effective rate of time preference for an individual that faces the mortality rate m.
2.7  Transformation from real into virtual time
Because the mortality rate m is an endogenous variable, it must eliminated from the 
discount factor of the utility function (10) by Uzawa’s (1968) transformation





> 0 hold true, one can 
define (t) as an alternative virtual time variable and set the variables in terms of it. 
With the transformation (11), the utility function (10) and the evolution of the state 

















































, m(T) = mT , 0 < 𝛾 < 1, MP > 0,














, P(T) = PT , 0 < 𝜉 < 1.
10 It is also possible to define an individual’s temporary utility U as a function of that individual’s mor-
tality rate m as well. Because then the function U would still be the same for the family and the govern-
ment, the results would nevertheless be the same as in the current version.
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3  The government
3.1  Optimal behavior
To obtain the first-best optimum, it is assumed that the government can control the 
economy by the per individual amounts of the change of capital, s ≐ dk
dt
 , labor input 
 , public health care g, private health expenditures h and carbon energy b. Noting 
(1), (2), (3), (5), (7) and (8), consumption per individual, c, can be derived as a func-
tion the government’s controls ( s,, g, h, b ) and state variables (m, k, P) as follows:
In Appendix 2, the marginal cost of pollution P – when the long-run mortality rate 
M, population N, capital stock K, emissions B, public health care G and labor input 
per individual,  , are held constant – is derived as follows:
Because of two opposing effects, the sign of this marginal cost is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, an increase in pollution P increases the long-run mortality rate by 
the amount MP , compelling the families to increase their private health care by the 








|| . It is assumed that the positive effect through the long-run mortality rate M 
dominates over the negative effect through the fertility rate f, so that 𝜖 > 0 . Other-
wise, we would obtain the unlikely case that pollution is not a social loss.11
It is convenient to define the social cost of pollution,  , as the value of the flow 
of the marginal cost of pollution,  , discounted by the sum of the natural absorbtion 
rate of pollution,  , and the effective rate of time preference,  + m:
The faster the stock of pollution disappears (i.e., the higher  ) or the higher an indi-
vidual’s effective rate of time preference, ρ+m, is, the less worried the individuals are 







− (f − m)k = y − c − h − g − qb + (m − f − )k ⇔
c(s,, g, h, b,m, k,P) ≐ y(k,, b) − s − h − g − qb + [m − f (,P) − ]k with
c
b















































(19)𝜂 ≐ 𝜀𝜉 + 𝜌 + m > 0.
11 If 𝜖 < 0 held true, then, by the definition (19) and Propositions 1 and 2, both fertility and the use of 
carbon energy should be subsidized, 𝜏f < 0 and 𝜏b < 0.
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The government maximizes the representative family’s welfare (12) by its controls 
( s,, g, h, b ) subject to consumption per individual, (17), and the evolution of popula-
tion N, the mortality rate m, capital per individual, k, and pollution P, (13)-(16). The 
value function for the government’s program at initial time T is then
3.2  Equilibrium conditions
Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the Bellman equation for the government’s pro-
gram (20) is constructed as follows:
The maximization of the function (22) by controls subject to the consumption func-
tion (17) yields the first-order conditions (cf., Appendix 3)
(20)
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Because Υ is concave in controls ( s,, h, g, b ), the government’s equilibrium is 
unique.
From (23) and (24) it follows that Mg = Mh . Then, the marginal effects of H and 







This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1 Public health care G must be extended up to the level at which its 
marginal efficiency in decreasing the long-run mortality rate M, −Mg
g
H
 , is equal to 
that of private health care H, −Mh
g
H
 , given pollution P and population N.
Because both private and public health care are produced from the final good to 
decrease the mortality rate, efficiency requires that their marginal effects are equal.
3.3  Solution
The solution of dynamic programming is based on finding a proper specification for 
the value function (20). In Appendix 4, the following function is found:
Noting (19) and (28), condition (26) becomes
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal tax on carbon energy is equal to the social cost of pollu-
tion, 𝜏b = 𝜂 > 0.
4  The representative family
4.1  Saving
The representative family takes pollution P, the tax n on population N, the tax f  on 
fertility fN, public health care per individual, g, the wage w for labor L and the inter-
est rate r paid to capital K as given. Because capital K is the only asset in the model, 
investment dK
dt
























































⇔ (𝜉 + 𝜌 + m)𝜏b = 𝜀 ⇔ 𝜏b =
𝜀
𝜉 + 𝜌 + m
= 𝜂 > 0.
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where wL is labor income, rK capital income, C consumption, H private health 
care, nN + f fN the family’s tax expenditures and  the constant rate of deprecia-
tion for capital K.
The family determines the change of its capital per individual, s = dk
dt
 , labor input 
per individual,  , and health expenditures per individual h subject to the evolution of its 
mortality rate m, (14), and that of its capital per individual, k, (15). By (2), (7), (8) and 
(29), consumption per individual, c, is a function of the family’s controls ( s,, h ), state 
variables (m, k), and exogenous variables ( P, g, n, f ,w, r ) (cf., Appendix 5):
4.2  Optimal behavior
The representative family maximizes its utility (12) by its controls ( s,, h ) subject to its 
consumption per individual, (30), the evolution of its mortality rate, (14), and its capital 
per individual, (15), given its exogenous variables ( P, n, f , g,w, r ). This defines the 
value function at initial time T as follows:
The family’s program (31) is independent of the family size N.
The Bellman equation for the family’s program (31) is given by
The maximization of the function (32) by the controls ( s,, h ) subject to the fam-




= wL + rK − C − H − (nN + f fN) − K,
(30)












= w − (k + f )f ,
c̃
k
= m − f + r − .
(31)




















Λ(s,, h,m, k,P, n, f ,w, r, g, T) with
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Because Λ is strictly concave in the controls (s, f, h), that equilibrium is unique.
4.3  Solution
The solution of dynamic programming is based on finding a specification for the 
value function (31). In Appendix 7, the following function is found:
Inserting the partial derivatives in (36) into the family’s first-order conditions (33) 
and (34) yields the government’s first-order conditions (24) and (25).
The optimal parental tax f  can be derived from (28), Proposition 2, the gov-
ernment’s first-order condition (27) and the family’s first-order condition (35) as 
follows:
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 The optimal parental tax per newborn, f  , is equal to the product of 
carbon energy per individual, b, and the social cost of pollution,  , discounted by an 
individual’s effective rate of time preference,  + m.
The product of carbon energy per newborn (= carbon energy per individual) and 
the social cost of pollution, b , characterizes the social cost of a newborn through 
pollution at a moment of time. The parental tax per newborn, f  , must be equal to 
the value of the social cost of a newborn over time, b , discounted an individual’s 
effective rate of time preference,  + m.
5  Concluding remarks
In this document, optimal public policy is constructed for a market economy with 
the following institutions. Firms produce output from labor, capital and pollutants. 
Families determine their saving, fertility and private health expenditures. Emissions 
are a by-product of the extraction and use of pollutants. The mortality rate depends 
on pollution and both private and public health care dynamically, with lags. The 
government can use linear taxes and public health care to control the economy.
In the literature, the authors that combine endogenous fertility with environ-
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in their models that the mortality rate (or longevity) is exogenous and there is no 
health care.12 Furthermore, Gomez (2001) and Bauldin (2011) suggest that if there 
is externality in health care, then it can be optimal to tax private health expenditures. 
In this document, the main results are the following. If public health care can be 
introduced to take care of externality in health care, then private health expenditures 
should not be taxed or subsidized. If public health care uses the same inputs as pri-
vate health care, then its expansion is welfare improving up to the level at which its 
marginal efficiency in decreasing the mortality rate is equal to that of private health 
care, given pollution and population. With this health care policy, two taxes – one on 
newborns and the other on pollutants – are sufficient to decentralize the social opti-
mum. These stabilize the population and eliminate the externality due to pollution.
To construct the optimality rules for the taxes on newborns and pollutants, infor-
mation on two concepts is needed. The first of these is the marginal cost of pollution 
on the assumption that the long-run mortality rate, population, capital stock, emis-
sions, public health care and labor input relative to population are held constant. The 
second is the social cost of pollution, i.e., the value of the flow of the marginal cost 
of pollution, discounted by the sum of the natural absorbtion rate of pollution, the 
mortality rate and the rate of time preference. The optimal tax on pollutants is equal 
to the social cost of pollution. The optimal parental tax per newborn is equal to the 
product of carbon energy per newborn and the social cost of pollution, discounted 
by the sum of the mortality rate and the rate of time preference. These result can be 
explained as follows. The greater the mortality rate, the rate of time preference or 
the natural absorbtion rate of pollution, the less worried the families are about future 
pollution. Consequently, the social optimum can be decentralized by smaller correc-
tive taxes.
Appendix
The utility function (Eq. 10)
It is assumed that at any time, t, an individual derives its temporary utility U from 
consumption per head, c ≐ C∕N , and the fertility rate, f, in its family through the 
strictly concave function U(c,  f). Plugging the fertility function from (7) into that 
function yields
Because the mortality rate is m, the probability of dying in a short time dt is equal to 
mdt , the probability that an individual will survive beyond the period [T, t], is given 











12 Cf., Harford (1997, 1998), Jöst and Quaas (2009) and De la Croix and Gosseries (2012).
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The utility function of the representative family is then the expected utility of the 
representative member of that family for the planning period t ∈ [0,∞) as follows:13
where  is the constant rate of time preference for an individual who could live 
forever.
The marginal cost of pollution (Eq. 18)
Because any costs due to pollution P deprive crowd out consumption C, the mar-
ginal cost of pollution can defined by  ≐ − C
P
 . Keeping the long-run mortality rate 
M, population N, capital stock K, emissions B, public health care G and labor input 
per individual,  , constant, from (2), (7), (9) and (17) it follows that
The government’s first‑order conditions (Eqs 23‑27)








































































































































































































































13 According to Jöst and Quaas (2010), the alternative way of defining the utility function of the repre-





e−tdt . That 
definition, however, makes social welfare artificially dependent of the size of the family, N, while the 
arithmetic average of the members’ utilities leads back to the definition (37).
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The government’s value function (Eq. 28)
In the steady state of the system (13)-(16), it holds true that
The condition M(P, g, h) = m defines the steady-state private health care per indi-
vidual, h , as a function of the mortality rate m, public health care g and pollution P 
as follows [cf., (13) and (14)]:
By (2), (5), (17), (18), (38) and (39), steady-state consumption per individual, c , is 
defined as the following function of the mortality rate m, capital per individual, k, and 
pollution P:
The solution of dynamic programming is based on finding a specification for the 
value function Ψ that is defined by (28). Because the optimal policy must lead the 
system to the steady state (38), the value function Ψ must hold true in the steady 
state. Noting (21) and (22), this hint leads to
Thus, one can examine whether the value function
solves the problem. Noting (40) and (18), the partial derivatives of the function (41) 




= s = 0,
dN
d
= 0 ⇔ f (,P) = m,
dP
d



























c(m, k,P,N) ≐ max
,g
{
y(k,, b) − s − h(m, g,P) − g − qb +
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= (yk − f + m − )f=m = r − ,
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(41)Ψ(m, k,N,P, T) = max
s,,h,g,b
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The family’s consumption function (Eq. 30)
By Eqs. (2), (7), (8) and (29) the function (30) can be defined as follows:
This function has the partial derivatives
The family’s first‑order conditions (Eqs. 23‑27)
The first-order conditions for maximizing the function Eq. (32) by the controls 
(s, f, h) subject to Eq. (30) are
The family’s value function (Eq. 36)
In the steady state of the system Eqs. (14) and (15), it holds true that









































































− (f − m)k = [wL + rK − C − H − nN − f fN − K]∕N − (f − m)k
= w + rk − c − h − n − f f (,P) − k − [f (,P) − m]k ⇔
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f )f ,
c̃
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By Eqs. (30) and (43) steady-state consumption per individual, ĉ , can be defined as 
a function of the fertility rate f, the mortality rate m, capital per individual, k, public 
health care per individual, g, and pollution P:
By Eqs. (32) and (44) the value function can be defined as follows:
Noting Eqs. (28) and (44) the partial derivatives of the function Eq. (45)  are
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